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DISCRIMINATION IN SELECTION DECISIONS:
INTEGRATING STEREOTYPE FIT AND
INTERDEPENDENCE THEORIES
SUN YOUNG LEE
University of College London
MARKO PITESA
University of Maryland
STEFAN THAU
INSEAD
MADAN M. PILLUTLA
London Business School
We integrate stereotype fit and interdependence theories to propose a model that
explains how and why decision makers discriminate in selection decisions. Our model
suggests that decision makers draw on stereotypes about members of different social
groups to infer the degree to which candidates possess the specific ability required for
the task. Decisionmakers perceive candidates that have a greater ability required for the
task as less (more) instrumental to their personal outcomes if they expect to compete
(cooperate) with the candidate, and they discriminate in favor of candidates that are
perceived as more instrumental to them. We tested our theory in the context of racial
(Studies 1–3) and age (Study 4) discrimination in selection decisions with all-male
samples and found evidence consistent with our predictions. By explaining when and
why decision makers discriminate in favor of, but also against, members of their own
social group, this research may help to explain the mixed support for the dominant view
that decision makers exhibit favoritism toward candidates that belong to the same social
group. In addition, our research demonstrates the importance of considering the largely
overlooked role of interdependent relationships within the organization in order to
understand discrimination in organizations.
Discrimination, or differential treatment based on
membership to social groups based on aspects such
as race, age, religion, and gender (Lippert-Rasmussen,
2006), continues to be a major problem in organi-
zations. For example, in the United States 38,221
race-based employment discrimination charges were
filed in 2011 alone (U.S. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, 2011). Because discrimination
involves treatment of individuals based on cues that
are unrelated to work performance, it can lead to
suboptimal organizational decisions such as the
hiring of less qualified candidates (Bertrand &
Mullainathan, 2003). Workplace discrimination
also undermines broader societal goals of social
justice and equality of opportunity (Fassinger,
2008).
Discrimination in organizations begins with se-
lection decisions, which are defined as decisions
“aimed at choosing people for the fulfillment of
jobs” (Roe, 1998: 5). Examples of selection decisions
include recruitment decisions and decisions about
the allocation of individuals to specific work tasks.
Because selection decisions determine such a major
outcome for candidates—that is, getting versus not
getting the job one is applying for—they are hugely
impactful with respect to individuals’ career and
pay progression (Boudreau, Boswell, & Judge, 2001;
Gatewood, Feild, & Barrick, 2008). In this research,
we seek to advance understanding of this important
phenomenon.
A large body of research has argued that decision
makers exhibit favoritism toward candidates that
belong to their own social group (e.g., candidates of
the same race, gender, or age) when making selec-
tion decisions (Finkelstein, Burke, & Raju, 1995;
Goldberg, 2005; Lin, Dobbins, & Farh, 1992; Pager &
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Shepherd, 2008; Prewett-Livingston, Feild, Veres, &
Lewis, 1996; Whitley & Kite, 2009). The racial dis-
crimination literature provides a good example of
this argument, in that decision makers are generally
thought to discriminate in favor of candidates of
their own race (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003;
Goldberg, 2005; Lin et al., 1992; Pager, Western, &
Bonikowski, 2009; Prewett-Livingston et al., 1996;
Triandis, 1963). However, a close look at empirical
studies reveals that evidence for this theory of dis-
crimination in selection decisions is mixed. Some
studies have found no racial preference (Lai &
Babcock, 2012; Lewis & Sherman, 2003; McFarland,
Ryan, Sacco, & Kriska, 2004; Sacco, Scheu, Ryan, &
Schmitt, 2003; Stewart & Perlow, 2001), while oth-
ers even find that decision makers prefer candidates
of different races (King, Mendoza, Madera, Hebl, &
Knight, 2006; Linville & Jones, 1980; McIntyre,
Moberg, & Posner, 1980; Mullins, 1982; Terpstra &
Larsen, 2011). The mixed body of evidence is not
limited to racial discrimination. The literature on
age discrimination is another example. Some stud-
ies have found no age-based preference (Connor,
Walsh, Litzelman, & Alvarez, 1978; Hitt & Barr,
1989) and others have even highlighted a preference
for candidates who belong to different age groups
(Bell & Stanfield, 1973; Schwab & Heneman, 1978;
Singer & Sewell, 1989).
How can these mixed findings be explained?
In this paper, we integrate stereotype fit theory
(Dipboye, 1985; Heilman, 1983) with interdependence
theory (Deutsch, 1949) to provide a novel theoretical
model of how and why decision makers discriminate
when making selection decisions. Figure 1 contains
an overview of our theoretical model. The key pre-
diction of the model is that decision makers dis-
criminate in favor of candidates perceived to be
relatively more instrumental (i.e., helpful) to their
personal outcomes in the organizational context
marked by different task requirements and expected
decision-maker–candidate interdependence. We
posit that decision makers draw on stereotypical
beliefs about members of different social groups to
infer the degree to which candidates possess the
specific ability required for the task for which they are
being considered (Heilman, 1983). In addition, we
argue that decision makers take into account the type
of expected interdependence with the candidate
to judge how instrumental the candidate would be
to their personal outcomes (Deutsch, 1949). If the
decision maker expects to compete (cooperate)
with the candidate, candidates stereotyped as hav-
ing a greater ability with respect to the task are
perceived as less (more) instrumental to the de-
cision maker as they represent more capable com-
petitors (cooperators). Decision makers prefer
candidates that are perceived as more instrumental
to them, which determines the pattern of discrimi-
nation in selection decisions.
We tested our theory across four studies: a lab
experiment, a field experiment, and two online
experiments among male employees. We began this
research by testing our theory in the context of racial
discrimination in Studies 1–3, because racial dis-
crimination has traditionally been one of the core
research contexts in the employment discrimina-
tion literature (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Kraiger &
Ford, 1985; McIntyre et al., 1980). Race is also one of
the primary characteristics by which people cate-
gorize others (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000), and
has served as the basis for some of the most wide-
spread and egregious forms of discrimination, in-
cluding discrimination at work (Fredrickson, 2002).
In Study 4, we extended this research by testing our
theory in the context of age discrimination. The
purpose of this extension is to provide additional
evidence for the generalizability of our theoretical
model. Age discrimination is a timely context to test
our theory, given the ageing workforce in the United
States and other industrial nations (Feyrer, 2007).
The U.S. Census Bureau (2012) forecasts that by the
year 2042, one in five Americans will be 65 or older,
and more and more older workers are delaying re-
tirement and remaining in the workforce (Employee
Benefit Research Institute, 2013).
This paper makes two key contributions. First, the
dominant theoretical paradigm underlying several
decades of research on discrimination in selection
decisions suggests that decision makers discriminate
FIGURE 1
Overview of the Theoretical Model
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in favor of candidates that belong to the decision
makers’ own social group (Allport, 1954; Pager &
Shepherd, 2008; Whitley & Kite, 2009). However,
as noted previously, some research has not found
support for this, or has even identified oppo-
site discriminatory tendencies, highlighting the
need for a theory that specifies conditions under
which decision makers prefer candidates who
belong to the same social group, as well as con-
ditions under which such candidates are dis-
criminated against. This research proposes and
tests such a theory.
Second, we contribute to research on discrimi-
nation in organizations by theoretically situating
decision makers’ behavior in the context of
interdependent relationships within the organi-
zation and specifying how different types of in-
terdependence between the decision maker and the
candidate determine the pattern of discrimination
in selection decisions. The majority of past expla-
nations of discrimination in organizations has as-
sumed that decision makers expect no future
relationship with the candidate (Brief, Dietz, Cohen,
Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000). Yet, selection decisions are
often made in the context of anticipated intra-
organizational interdependence between the de-
cision maker and the candidate (Edenborough, 2005;
Harris, Brewster, & Sparrow, 2003). We demonstrate
the importance of taking into account this feature of
the organizational context by showing that it can
fundamentally change how individuals discriminate
in selection decisions.
THEORY
The dominant view of discrimination in organi-
zations is that decision makers exhibit (some de-
gree of) favoritism toward candidates that belong to
the same social group when making selection deci-
sions (Allport, 1954; Pager & Shepherd, 2008;
Whitley & Kite, 2009). The reason why decision
makers discriminate in this way has been explained
by several related theoretical perspectives, which
we briefly summarize below.
The social identity approach suggests that people
categorize others as being in-group or out-group
members based on salient individual characteristics
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Categorization activates
positive cognitive and emotional reactions toward
in-group members and derogatory responses to-
ward out-group members, a phenomenon that is
said to serve the function of self-esteem enhance-
ment. The positive reactions toward in-group
members should lead to their preferential selec-
tion in organizations.
Likewise, the similarity-attraction model (Byrne &
Nelson, 1965) suggests that people find interactions
with similar others to serve as a means of positive
reinforcement, and thus exhibit greater liking for
those who correspond with them in terms of char-
acteristics such as attitudes, race, and age (Byrne &
Nelson, 1965). Because similar individuals are liked
more, people should prefer them in selection deci-
sions (Peters & Terborg, 1975).
Finally, theoretical perspectives that emphasize
intergroup conflict, including realistic conflict the-
ory (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, Harvey,White, Hood, &
Sherif, 1961), the stereotype content model (Fiske,
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), and evolutionary models
(e.g., Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003), suggest that
competition with out-groups creates favoritism for
members of the same social group and hostility to-
ward members of different social groups.
Although past research finds some support for the
prediction that decision makers discriminate in fa-
vor of candidates that belong to the same social
group, a sizeable body of research has failed to find
support for this prediction, and some papers have
even found an opposite trend, as we noted at the
outset of the paper. In the subsequent sections, we
address this explanatory problem by proposing
a novel theoretical model that diverges from past
perspectives by making the prediction that, under
certain conditions, decision makers will system-
atically discriminate in favor of candidates that
belong to different social groups. For this reason,
our theory may explain the seeming irregularity in
the pattern of discrimination in selection deci-
sions, and in that way provide insights into the
fundamental processes driving discrimination in
organizations.
Candidate Social Group Membership–Task
Requirement Stereotype Fit
Our model proposes that those in charge of se-
lection decisions make inferences about the degree
to which candidates possess the specific ability re-
quired for the task based (among other things) on
stereotypical beliefs about different social groups,
such as racial or age groups, to which the candidate
belongs. Stereotypes are generalized beliefs about
characteristics that are possessed by people who
belong to certain social groups (Hilton & Von Hippel,
1996; Lippman, 1922), and constitute a mecha-
nism by which people interpret and manage the
2015 791Lee, Pitesa, Thau, and Pillutla
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wealth of social stimuli encountered in everyday
life (Hamilton, 1979; Taylor, 1981). For instance,
people often infer that Asian individuals will be
highly competent in quantitative tasks (Shih, Pittinsky,
& Ambady, 1999).
Drawing on stereotypical beliefs about different
social groups, decision makers may infer the degree
to which candidates possess the ability required for
successful fulfillment of the specific organizational
tasks for which the candidate is being considered.
Task specialization is a fundamental means by
which organizations attain their goals (March &
Simon, 1958;Weber, 1947), and organizations attempt
to match tasks with individuals who have the abil-
ities required for successful execution of these tasks
(Kristof, 1996). Although many tasks require mul-
tiple abilities, in most cases different abilities are
not of equal importance for successful performance
in the given task. Therefore, it follows that one
ability will be more important than others for suc-
cessful performance in a given task (Durkheim,
1997). Stereotypical beliefs about the abilities of
members of different social groups constitute one
source of information about the degree to which the
candidate possesses the ability required for the task.
For instance, if the task requires strong quantitative
skills, an Asian candidate (stereotyped as having
strong quantitative skills) should be more likely to
be seen as having a greater ability required for the
task compared to a white candidate (for whom the
stereotypical belief concerning quantitative skills is
not as positive).
This proposition is consistent with the stereotype
fit hypothesis (Dipboye, 1985; Heilman, 1983),
which suggests that decision makers perceive
members of different social groups to be a better or
lesser fit (i.e., possessing different levels of the re-
quired characteristics) for specific work tasks based
on the stereotypes held about their social group. For
instance, women might be stereotyped as lacking
masculine traits and therefore unfit for tasks re-
quiring such characteristics (Glick, Zion, & Nelson,
1988). Similarly, we expect that decision makers
infer the degree to which candidates possess the
specific ability required for the task based on ste-
reotypical beliefs about the abilities of the candi-
date’s social group. At a more general level, this
proposition is also consistent with the statistical
theory of discrimination formulated in the eco-
nomics literature (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972),
which suggests that in the context where employers
lack perfect information, they estimate candidates’
expected performance by drawing on their naı¨ve
beliefs about the average performance of different
social groups.1
Decision-Maker–Candidate Interdependence
Our theory further suggests that the expected in-
terdependence between the decision maker and the
candidate affects the pattern of discrimination in
selection decisions. As outlined in the introduction,
a major problem we see with most extant models of
discrimination in organizations is that they assume
that decision makers act in a social vacuum and are
in no way personally affected by the future perfor-
mance of the candidate.
Yet, decision makers often make selection deci-
sions that lead to introduction of the candidate into
their own organization or work team (Edenborough,
2005; Harris et al., 2003). For example, in the
financial services company J.P. Morgan, employees
participate in making selection decisions about
their future peers (J.P. Morgan, 2013). Google has
a similar policy, whereby employees evaluate their
future peers and have a say in selection decisions
(Google, 2013). In academic departments, candi-
dates are often selected by members of the same
department (Darley, Zanna, & Roediger, 2003).
For this reason, decision makers should expect can-
didates’ future performance to also be relevant to their
personal outcomes. For example, a decisionmakermay
believe that a capable candidate may be suitable for
a position that the decision maker aspires to, and thus
represents a potential threat in terms of career ad-
vancement. In a different situation, a capable candidate
may be viewed as a future collaborator who can im-
prove the decision maker’s career prospects. Although
such expected interdependence can have important
implications for interpersonal decisions (Deutsch, 1949;
Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), it has largely been overlooked
by past research on selection decisions.
Two main types of interdependence have been
distinguished in the organizational literature: co-
operation and competition (Deutsch, 1949; Johnson
& Johnson, 1989; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Wageman,
1995). The way the organization arranges rewards
1 Statistical theory of discrimination focuses on social
group membership as a signal of general work ability,
rather than a particular ability required for a specific task.
Yet, different social groups may be stereotyped as com-
petent in one work domain but not another (e.g., for the
case of Asians, see Berdahl & Min, 2012; Sy et al., 2010).
For this reason, we focus on stereotypes related to the
particular ability required for a specific task.
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and tasks can create the expectation that the decision
maker’s outcomeswill be either positively (cooperative
interdependence) or negatively (competitive interde-
pendence) correlated with the candidate’s outcomes
(Deutsch, 1949; Johnson & Johnson, 1989; Kelley &
Thibaut, 1978). For example, in many positions,
employees’ performance is assessedrelative to the per-
formance of their coworkers, thereby creating compet-
itive interdependence (Becker & Huselid, 1992). In
other cases, organizations evaluate and remunerate
joint performance of teams, thus creating cooperative
interdependence between team members (Sundstrom,
De Meuse, & Futrell, 1990). Many situations entail
amix of cooperative and competitive elements, but the
two are rarely perfectly balanced in the real world
(Tjosvold, 1988; Tjosvold, Andrews, & Struthers,
1991). For that reason, one of the two types of inter-
dependence generally serves as a more salient guide
for behavior (Deutsch, 1949; Johnson& Johnson, 1989).
We propose that the nature of interdependence
between the decision maker and the candidate will
determine whether the decision maker discrimi-
nates against or in favor of the candidate that is ste-
reotyped as having a greater ability required for the
task. When expecting competitive interdependence,
a candidate that is stereotyped as having a greater
ability required for the task will be seen as less in-
strumental (i.e., more threatening) to the decision
maker’s personal outcomes, because the candidate
will represent a more capable future competitor.
Thus, in this situation decision makers should dis-
criminate against the candidate that is stereotyped
as having a greater ability required for the task.
Hypothesis 1. When decision makers expect to
compete with a candidate, they discriminate
against candidates that are stereotyped as
having a greater ability required for the task.
In contrast, when the decision maker expects to
cooperate with a candidate, a candidate that is ste-
reotyped as having a greater ability required for the
task will be seen as more instrumental (i.e., more
helpful) to the decision maker’s personal outcomes
because such a candidate will represent a more ca-
pable future cooperator. Thus, in this situation de-
cision makers should discriminate in favor of the
candidate that is stereotyped as having a greater
ability required for the task.
Hypothesis 2. When decision makers expect
to cooperate with a candidate, they discrimi-
nate in favor of candidates that are stereotyped
as having a greater ability required for the task.
The underlying psychological mechanism implied
by our theory is that decision makers discriminate
in favor of candidates that are seen as more in-
strumental to their personal goals. This theoretical
formulation implies a mediated moderation model
whereby the stereotypical perception of a candidate’s
greater ability required for the task leads to lower
(higher) selection preference when the decision
maker and the candidate are expected to compete
(cooperate) due to the lower (higher) perceived in-
strumentality of the candidate to the decision maker.
Figure 2 depicts this moderated mediation model.
Hypothesis 3. Stereotypical perception of
a candidate’s greater ability required for the
task leads to a lower (higher) perception of the
instrumentality of the candidate to the decision
maker when the two are expected to compete
(cooperate), in turn causing lower (higher) se-
lection preference.
STUDY 1: METHODS
The initial test of our theory (Studies 1–3) was
conducted in the context of racial discrimination
in selection decisions between White and Asian
candidates. The focus on White candidates ensured
continuity with past research on selection deci-
sions, which predominately considered White as
the race that is discriminated in favor of (Pager &
Shepherd, 2008; Whitley & Kite, 2009). We chose
Asians as the non-White comparison group because
Asians constitute not only the largest racial group in
the world (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013), but
also the largest group of legal immigrants to the
United States (Pew Research Center, 2013) and the
United Kingdom (Office for National Statistics,
2013). Our choice also has a practical value: Despite
indications that Asians are discriminated against in
the workplace (Bell, Harrison, & McLaughlin, 1997;
Kim & Lewis, 1994; Tang, 1993), the literature on
racial discrimination in organizations has largely
overlooked this group (Cheng & Thatchenkery, 1997).
To test our theory, we examined discrimination
in selection decisions for tasks in which Whites
versus Asians are stereotyped as having a greater
ability required for successful performance in the
task. Most research shows that Asians and Whites
are stereotyped similarly in terms of global stereo-
typical perceptions—that is, as relatively compe-
tent but somewhat cold (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick,
2007; Sanchez & Bonam, 2009; Wong, 1980).
However, the competence dimension can be further
differentiated into intellectual competence and
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dominance to identify differences in stereotypical
beliefs about Asians versus Whites. Specifically,
Asians are stereotyped as more intellectually com-
petent but less dominant than Whites (Berdahl &
Min, 2012; Sy et al., 2010). The perception of in-
tellectual competence focuses on general cognitive
abilities and is defined by such characteristics as
intelligent, smart, knowledgeable, and skilled,
whereas the perception of dominance focuses on
interpersonal abilities and is defined by such char-
acteristics as dominant, assertive, persuasive, and
self-confident (Ridgeway, 1987; Wiggins, Phillips, &
Trapnell, 1989).
Given the differential stereotypes of Asians and
Whites in terms of intellectual competence and
dominance, we tested our theory by examining
selection decisions between Asian versus White
candidates for tasks requiring either primarily in-
tellectual competence or primarily dominance for
successful performance. Our hypotheses imply
that when decision makers select candidates for
tasks that require intellectual competence, and
these decision makers expect to be competitively
(cooperatively) interdependent with the candidate
who is hired, they should discriminate against (in
favor of) Asian candidates because Asians are
stereotyped as having a greater ability required for
the task. In contrast, when decision makers select
candidates for tasks requiring predominately
dominance, and these decision makers expect to
be competitively (cooperatively) interdependent
with the candidate who is hired, they should dis-
criminate against (in favor of) White candidates,
because Whites are stereotyped as having a greater
ability required for the task. Finally, the percep-
tion of the instrumentality of the candidate to the
decision maker should mediate these discrimina-
tory tendencies.
Participants and Design
A total of 98% of White males recruited from
a university subject pool (mean age 5 27.75, SD 5
7.34) took part in a lab experiment in exchange for
£10.2 Given the large body of research documenting
differential treatment as a function of both candi-
date’s and decision maker’s gender (Olian, Schwab,
& Haberfeld, 1988), we sought to minimize this ad-
ditional source of variance by focusing on (same-
sex) dyads of males in all studies.3 In addition,
Study 1 used a sample of White individuals for
reasons of continuity with past research, which
purported to document a preference for White can-
didates primarily among White decision makers
(Goldberg, 2005; Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Whitley &
Kite, 2009). We sought to demonstrate that this
tendency can reverse in favor of non-White candi-
dates under conditions specified by our theory, and
in that way provide a conservative test of our model.
FIGURE 2
The Role of Perceived Candidate Instrumentality in Racial Discrimination: Moderated Mediation Model
2 In this and all subsequent studies, no participants
were excluded.
3 We return to this point in the general discussion,
where we consider the generalizability of our theory to
women.
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Participants were randomly assigned to the con-
ditions of a 2 (interdependence: competition versus
cooperation; between-subject) 3 2 (task requirement:
intellectual competence versus dominance; between-
subject) 3 2 (candidate race: Asian versus White;
within-subject) design.
Procedure and Materials
Participants arrived at the lab in groups of between
four and six and were told by the experimenter that
they would participate in a tournament along with
other participants. The tournament purportedly con-
sisted of two parts: tournament participant selection
and three rounds of tournament tasks. The partic-
ipants were told that tournament member selection
would be conducted individually in separate rooms.
Afterward, all participants would engage in tourna-
ment tasks in a larger room. As the lab was running
multiple experiments at the same time, participants
were able to see both Whites and Asians in the wait-
ing area, which was expected to make the cover story
more convincing. In reality, we were only interested
in participants’ selection decisions, and the tourna-
ment did not actually take place.
We seated the participant in an individual room,
and the experimenter then asked the participant to
complete a one-page profile sheet, including dif-
ferent personal information such as name, date and
country of birth, length of residence in the United
Kingdom, educational history, fluency in English,
and hobbies. After about three minutes, the experi-
menter re-entered the room to collect the partic-
ipant’s profile sheet and told the participant the
following: “You will select another participant for
the tournament. I will come back with the profile
sheets of the candidates. While you are waiting,
please spend time familiarizing yourself with the
rules of the tournament.” Then, the experimenter
handed over a one-page tournament instruction
sheet, which contained our manipulations of task
requirement and interdependence.
Task requirement manipulation and pretest.
Task requirement was manipulated by varying the
tasks the tournament was said to consist of. Partic-
ipants in the intellectual competence condition read
that the tournament consisted of forecasting the
price of a stock based on contextual information
such as the price of related goods. They were pro-
vided with several sample questions and answers.
This task was the probability learning task, which
has been shown to require primarily intellectual
competence (Hagafors & Brehmer, 1983). Participants
in the dominance condition read that they would
debate on controversial topics. Debating is known
to require dominance-related capabilities such as
self-confidence, persuasiveness, and assertiveness
(Johnson, 2009). The instruction sheet included
several sample topics, such as the importance of
love in marriage and the importance of financial
versus non-financial rewards for employee
motivation.
We conducted a task requirement pretest among
an independent sample of adult males (n 5 51;
mean age5 27.39, SD5 7.94) to verify that the stock
price forecasting task was seen as requiring a higher
level of intellectual competence (and less domi-
nance) compared to the debating task. Participants
for this and all other pretests were recruited from an
online crowdsourcing mechanism with members
representative of the U.S. population (Buhrmester,
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011 for subject pool details).
Following previous research (Berdahl & Min, 2012;
Wiggins, Trapnell, & Phillips, 1988), participants
were asked to indicate how important the following
characteristics were for success at each of the two
tasks: intelligent, smart, knowledgeable, and skilled
(intellectual competence); and dominant, assertive,
persuasive, and self-confident (dominance). Stock
price forecasting was seen as requiring a higher level
of intellectual competence (mean 5 6.26, SD5 0.77;
a5 .85) compared todebating (mean5 5.47,SD5 1.31;
a 5 .91), F(1, 50) 5 20.34, p , .001, hp
2 5 .29. In
contrast, debating (mean5 5.94, SD5 0.82; a5 .81)
was seen as requiring a higher level of dominance
compared to stock price forecasting (mean 5 4.52,
SD 5 1.36; a 5 .85), F(1, 50) 5 58.60, p , .001,
hp
25 .54. Thus, the manipulation of task requirement
was effective.
Interdependencemanipulation.Next, interdependence
was manipulated by varying whether it was said
that the candidate would compete against or cooperate
with the participant in the tournament (Beersma
et al., 2003). Participants in the competition (cooperation)
condition read:
In the first round of the tournament, you will com-
pete with the person you choose as your opponent
(cooperate with the person you choose as your team
partner in the competition against an opponent team).
The participant (team) who outperforms the oppo-
nent (the opponent team) will move to the next round
of the tournament and have a chance of winning the
financial reward. The participant (team) who loses the
first round is eliminated from the competition andwill
be assigned to work on unrelated individual tasks.
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Because participants were explicitly told whether
they would be competing against or cooperating
with the other participant, we did not additionally
checkwhether themanipulation affected participants’
expectations of competition versus cooperation with
the candidate. After about five minutes, the ex-
perimenter returned to the individual room to give
the participant the profile sheets ostensibly filled
out by two other participants, as well as a sheet on
which candidate evaluation and choice would be
indicated.
Race manipulation and pretest. Following pre-
vious research (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003), the
candidate’s race was manipulated by varying the
name and country of origin indicated on the two
profiles (Asian candidate: Yoshi Takahashi, Japan;
White candidate: Geoffrey Johnson, United States).
Information other than race included in the profile
sheet was similar and only included minor differ-
ences in terms of year of birth (1985 or 1986), length
of residence in the United Kingdom (15 or 16 years),
university major (King’s College London major in
either business or management), hobbies (running or
swimming), etc. Participants were informed that both
candidates were fluent in English. We counter-
balanced the race of the candidate across the two
profiles, which ensured that any effect of candidate
race was due to our race manipulation and not to any
differences in information between the two profiles.
We conducted a race manipulation pretest to
check whether our manipulation effectively influ-
enced the perceived race of the candidate using an
independent sample of adult males (n 5 58, mean
age 5 26.28, SD 5 8.32). The majority of partic-
ipants correctly identified the race of the White
candidate (89.7%), x2(1, n 5 58) 5 36.48, p , .001,
as well as the race of the Asian candidate (98.3%),
x2(1, n 5 78) 5 54.07, p , .001, among the racial cat-
egories recognized by the U.S. Census Bureau (2013).
Candidate perceptions and selection decisions.
After reviewing the profiles, the participants
responded to a set of measures about each candidate.
These included the same measures of perceived in-
tellectual competence (aWhite 5 .79; aAsian 5 .82) and
dominance (aWhite 5 .82; aAsian 5 .85) as in the task
requirement pretest. In addition, to measure per-
ceived instrumentality of the candidate to the de-
cision maker, we followed previous research
(Fitzsimons & Shah, 2009) and asked participants to
indicate their agreement (15 “strongly disagree” to 75
“strongly agree”) with the statement “If I choose [can-
didate name] as my opponent (partner), this makes it
more likely that I will win the first round of the
tournament.” Finally, we measured selection prefer-
ence by asking participants to respond to the question
“Would you select [candidate name] as your opponent
(partner) for the tournament?” (1 5 “definitely would
not select” to 7 5 “definitely would select”).
Next, the experimenter collected the materials
and thoroughly debriefed participants. No partici-
pant expressed suspicion or concern regarding the
cover story or the procedure.
STUDY 1: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Stereotypes of Asians and Whites
Consistent with prior research, the Asian candi-
date (mean 5 5.99, SD 5 0.76) was seen as more
intellectually competent than the White candidate
(mean5 5.14, SD5 0.72), F(1, 97)5 83.92, p, .001,
hp
25 .46. The White candidate (mean 5 5.55, SD 5
0.88) was seen as more dominant than the Asian
candidate (mean 5 4.20, SD 5 0.95), F(1, 97) 5
106.90, p , .001, hp
2 5 .52.
Discrimination in Selection Decisions
Means of selection decisions by condition
are displayed in Figure 3. Across conditions, de-
cision makers, who were White, exhibited a similar
preference for the White candidate (mean 5 4.84,
SD 5 1.43) as they did for the Asian candidate
(mean 5 4.77, SD 5 1.59), F(1, 94) 5 0.28, p 5 .868,
hp
2 5 .001. Therefore, we did not find evidence of
general discrimination in favor of candidates be-
longing to the same social group. We next analyzed
whether decision makers instead discriminated in
line with the predictions of our theoretical model.
For ease of interpretation, in all studies we focus on
analyses of simple effects of candidates’ social
group membership (in this case, race).4
The results show that when the task required in-
tellectual competence, the White candidate (mean 5
5.48, SD 5 0.75) was preferred to the Asian candi-
date (mean 5 3.41, SD 5 0.93) when the decision
4 Because we predict simple effects of candidate social-
groupmembership in the opposite direction as a function of
decision-maker–candidate interdependence and task type,
significant simple effects imply that all relevant two-way
and three-way interactions are also significant. Consistent
with this reasoning, in all studies, all simple two-way and
three-way interactions for both instrumentality perception
and selection decisions as the outcome variables are sig-
nificant at p , .001. All details are available from the first
author.
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maker expected to compete with the candidate, F(1,
94) 5 42.02, p , .001, hp
2 5 .31, but when the de-
cision maker expected to cooperate with the can-
didate, the Asian candidate (mean 5 5.92, SD 5 0.
83) was preferred to the White candidate (mean 5
4.29, SD 5 1.16), F(1, 94) 5 22.93, p , .001,
hp
2 5 .20.
In contrast, when the task required dominance,
the Asian candidate (mean 5 5.92, SD 5 1.25) was
preferred to theWhite candidate (mean5 3.67, SD5
1.40) when the decision maker expected to com-
pete with the candidate, F(1, 94) 5 43.96, p , .001,
hp
25 .32, but when the decision maker expected to
cooperate with the candidate, the White candidate
(mean 5 5.87, SD 5 1.22) was preferred to the
Asian candidate (mean5 3.96, SD5 1.36), F(1, 94)5
30.46, p , .001, hp
2 5 .25.
The results for both tasks thus support Hypothe-
ses 1 and 2: Decision makers discriminated against
candidates stereotyped as having a greater ability
required for the task when they expected to compete
with the candidate who would be hired, but in these
candidates’ favor when cooperation was expected.
The Role of Instrumentality Perception
To test Hypothesis 3, we followed guidelines by
Judd, Kenny, and McClelland (2001) for testing
mediation in the context of within-subject designs. Our
moderated mediation model is depicted in Figure 2.
OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression was used to
estimate individual paths and the significance of in-
direct effects was tested using the bootstrap method
with 10,000 resamples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002).
Because candidates’ relative ability varies for
each task, we tested the moderatedmediationmodel
separately for each task. For the task requiring in-
tellectual competence, we computed the relative
FIGURE 3
Study 1, Selection Decisions by Conditiona
a Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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difference in perceived intellectual competence, in-
strumentality, and selection preference by subtract-
ing the values for the White candidate from those for
the Asian candidate (who was stereotyped as more
intellectually competent). The results showed that
when the decision maker expected to compete with
the candidate, the perception of greater intellectual
competence of the Asian candidate led to a relatively
lower perception of the instrumentality of the can-
didate to the decision maker (b 5 20.35, SE 5 0.18,
p 5 .063) and, in turn, a lower selection preference
for the Asian (relative to White) candidate (condi-
tional indirect effect CI: 20.62, 20.08). In contrast,
when the decision maker expected to cooperate
with the candidate, the perception of greater in-
tellectual competence of the Asian candidate led to a
relatively higher perception of the instrumentality of
the candidate to the decision maker (b 5 1.05, SE 5
0.27, p , .001) and, in turn, a higher selection pref-
erence for the Asian (relative to White) candidate
(conditional indirect effect CI: 0.29, 1.62).
Next, we focused on the task requiring dominance
and computed the relative difference in perceived
dominance, instrumentality, and selection prefer-
ence by subtracting the values for the Asian candi-
date from those for the White candidate (who was
stereotyped as more dominant). The results indicate
that when the decision maker expected to compete
with the candidate, the perception of greater domi-
nance of the White candidate led to a relatively
lower perception of the instrumentality of the can-
didate to the decision maker (b 5 20.78, SE 5 0.27,
p 5 .006) and, in turn, a lower selection preference
for the White (relative to the Asian) candidate
(conditional indirect effect CI: 21.17, 20.33). In
contrast, when the decision maker expected to co-
operate with the candidate, the perception of greater
dominance of theWhite candidate led to a relatively
higher perception of the instrumentality of the
candidate to the decision maker (b 5 0.58, SE 5
0.20, p 5 .006) and, in turn, a higher selection
preference for the White (relative to the Asian)
candidate (conditional indirect effect CI: 0.23, 1.19).
The results thus support Hypothesis 3.
STUDY 2: METHODS
Study 2 sought to constructively replicate our
findings in the field.We conducted a field experiment
in which we unobtrusively manipulated task re-
quirement and interdependence in a tournament
organized in a business school association. The
second goal of Study 2 was to test our theory among
a sample of South Koreans to provide evidence that
the behavior in line with our theory that we docu-
mented in Study 1 was not specific to White de-
cision makers, and in that way to strengthen the
external validity of our conclusions. Finally, most
prior research has focused onWhite decision makers
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), so Study 2
represents an important addition to the extant body
of evidence because it examines a phenomenon
that fundamentally concerns interracial dynam-
ics among decision makers of a race other than
White.
Research Site and Participants
The sample consisted of members of the Man-
agement Consulting Student Association at a major
university in South Korea. Most association mem-
bers are undergraduates or master’s-level business
students. The association was established in 1996
with the goal of helping prepare its members for jobs
in management consulting. At any given time, the
association numbers about 100 active members;
they had over 500 alumni at the time of data col-
lection. The association organizes weekly sessions,
which include lectures, discussions, business case
competitions, and other group activities.
One of the authors had access to the association
as an alumnus. We learned that the association had
planned to hold an intensive two-week “Winter
Boot Camp” in January 2013, which would include
two five-hour sessions per week, consisting of
more diverse activities compared to those in-
volved in regular weekly sessions. In early De-
cember 2012, we contacted the president of the
association and requested to conduct data collec-
tion among association members. The managing
body of the association was informed of our re-
search and study design, and agreed to conduct
a field experiment among its members according to
our specifications.
However, due to ethical considerations, we were
asked not to administer measures pertaining to ste-
reotypical beliefs about White versus Asian candi-
dates and their perceived instrumentality. We
complied with this request, so Study 2 did not test
these two elements of our theory and instead fo-
cused only on Hypotheses 1 and 2. We considered
this acceptable because Study 2 provided a unique
opportunity to examine this sensitive behavior in
the field. In addition, due to the high degree of de-
ception involved in the study, we considered it
preferable to administer the minimum amount of
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measures resembling those commonly employed in
research studies so as to avoid suspicion.
We asked the association president to send an
e-mail message to 98 active male association
members one week prior to the “Winter Boot Camp.”
A total of 78 members responded to the email
(79.59% response rate). As described below,
through this e-mail correspondence we managed to
unobtrusively manipulate interdependence and
task requirements and measure participants’ se-
lection decisions. The participants’ average age
was 23 (SD 5 1.51). As a reward for members’
participation in the study, we provided the presi-
dent with $250.00 (in local currency) for the pur-
pose of funding a group dinner for the members,
which took place after the data collection was
completed.
Design, Procedure, and Materials
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions
of a 2 (interdependence: competition versus co-
operation; between-subject) 3 2 (task requirement:
intellectual competence versus dominance; between-
subject) 3 2 (candidate race: Asian versus White;
within-subject) design. They received an email from
the association president in which they were told that
they would participate in a tournament during one of
the sessions of the Winter Boot Camp. In the com-
petition (cooperation) condition, the e-mail read as
follows:
Hi; we are writing to inform you of a tournament
scheduled for the 19 January afternoon session. In
consultation with the educational coordinator, I de-
cided to invite some non-members, who are ex-
change students from the United States, to enrich the
tournament experience. Please read carefully the
following instructions and select one person as your
tournament opponent (partner).
Manipulations of task requirement and
interdependence. Next, participants read a de-
scription of the tournament, which contained
the manipulations of task requirement and in-
terdependence and was identical to that used in
Study 1.
Race manipulation. At the end of the e-mail,
participants were provided with profiles of the two
candidates, which contained the same race manip-
ulation used in Study 1. The information presented
in the two profiles had the same format as that of
Study 1 but was adapted to the study setting. The
contents of the profiles again included minor
differences (e.g., year of birth 1990 versus 1991;
degree in business versus management at the Uni-
versity of California, Santa Barbara) to increase be-
lievability. The e-mail stressed that both students
were fluent in English.
Candidate selection decisions. Finally, we asked
participants to reply to the e-mail and indicate
which candidate they wanted to be paired with
in the tournament. The choices expressed in the
participants’ responses served as our dependent
variable.
STUDY 2: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Discrimination in Selection Decisions
The participants’ selection decision frequencies
by condition are displayed in Figure 4. Across
conditions, the decision makers, who were Asians,
were about equally likely to select the Asian can-
didate (47.4%) as they were to select the White
candidate (52.6%), x2(1, n 5 78) 5 0.21, p 5 .651.
Therefore, we again did not find evidence of a gen-
eral preference for candidates of the same race. We
next examined whether the decision makers instead
discriminated in line with the predictions of our
theoretical model.
FIGURE 4
Study 2, Selection Decisions by Condition
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We conducted a moderated logistic regression
analysis to test differences in the participants’
selection decisions as a function of task require-
ment and interdependence. When the task required
intellectual competence, the coefficient for the ef-
fect of interdependence (0 5 cooperation, 1 5 com-
petition) on selection decisions (0 5 White, 1 5
Asian) was significant and negative, b 5 22.22,
SE 5 0.74, p 5 .003. This result shows a greater
likelihood of preference for the White candidate
when the decision maker expected to compete (ver-
sus cooperate) with the candidate, or, interpreted
differently, a greater likelihood of preference for the
Asian candidate when the decision maker expected
to cooperate (versus compete) with the candidate.
In contrast, when the task required dominance,
the coefficient for the effect of interdependence on
selection decisions was significant and positive, b5
3.47, SE5 0.94, p, .001. This result shows a greater
likelihood of preference for the Asian candidate
when the decision maker expected to compete
(versus cooperate) with the candidate, or, inter-
preted differently, a greater likelihood of preference
for the White candidate when the decision maker
expected to cooperate (versus compete) with the
candidate.
The results for both tasks thus support Hypothe-
ses 1 and 2: Decision makers discriminated against
candidates stereotyped as having a greater ability
required for the task when they expected to compete
with the candidate who would be hired, but in these
candidates’ favor when cooperation was expected.
STUDY 3: METHODS
Study 3 sought to extend the previous studies in
several ways. First, we used a different operation-
alization of selection decisions: Participants en-
gaged in a recruitment simulation and indicated
which candidate they would select to join their
department. Second, we used a different manipu-
lation of interdependence. Instead of manipulating
task and reward interdependence, we manipulated
whether the department’s culture was described as
competitive or cooperative (Chatman & Barsade,
1995). These modifications sought to enhance the
external validity of our conclusions through a con-
structive replication of previous studies. In addi-
tion, we used a different (more racially typical)
name for the White candidate in the hopes of
attaining even better effectiveness of the candidate
race manipulation. Finally, because Study 2 did
not test the role of instrumentality, we wanted to
provide additional evidence for our hypothesized
mechanism.
Participants and Design
We recruited 122 males with work experience
(mean age 5 32.19, SD 5 10.08; 91.0%White, 5.7%
Asian, 2.5% Black, and 0.8% Pacific Islander) from
the same online crowdsourcing mechanism used in
pretests for previous studies to participate in the
experiment in exchange for $1.00. As Studies 1 and
2 found no differences in results as a function of
participant race, we did not include race as a re-
cruitment criterion in this or the subsequent study.
Participants were randomly assigned to con-
ditions of a 2 (interdependence: competition versus
cooperation; between-subject)3 2 (task requirement:
intellectual competence versus dominance; between-
subject) 3 2 (candidate race: Asian versus White;
within-subject) design.
Procedure and Materials
All materials were presented via computer. Par-
ticipants were told they would engage in a re-
cruitment simulation, which we developed based
on vignettes of competition and cooperation at work
(Wageman, 1995). Participants were first asked to
read a scenario describing their work setting and
assume the role of a team member in charge of hir-
ing a new employee. Participants were then told
they would review profiles of potential candidates,
respond to measures of their perceptions of the
candidates, and indicate whether they would hire
the candidates.
Task requirement manipulation and pretest.
Task requirement was manipulated by varying the
description of the department to which participants
belonged. Participants in the intellectual compe-
tence (dominance) condition read that they had
just started working in the engineering (sales) de-
partment at ABC Company. Prior research has
found that work in these two departments is seen as
requiring significantly different levels of intellectual
competence versus dominance (Sy et al., 2010).
A task requirement pretest among an inde-
pendent sample of adult males (n 5 55; mean age 5
34.49, SD 5 12.15), which used the same items and
scales as the task requirement pretest in Study 1,
confirmed that the job in the engineering de-
partment was seen as requiring a higher level of
intellectual competence (mean 5 6.63, SD 5 0.58;
a5 .91) compared to the job in the sales department
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(mean 5 5.55, SD 5 1.02; a 5 .88), F (1, 54) 5 71.68,
p , .001, hp
2 5 .57. In contrast, the job in the sales
department was seen as requiring a higher level of
dominance (mean 5 6.06, SD 5 0.86; a 5 .80)
compared to the job in the engineering department
(mean 5 4.49, SD 5 1.10; a 5 .78), F(1, 54) 5 69.44,
p , .001, hp
2 5 .56.
Interdependence manipulation. We manipu-
lated interdependence by varying the description of
the department’s culture (Chatman & Barsade, 1995).
Participants in the competition (cooperation) condi-
tion read:
Your department is seen as having a very competi-
tive (cooperative) atmosphere. Individual (joint)
performance and individual (joint) initiative are
highly valued, and competition (cooperation) among
department members is considered to be the best
means toward career success.
To check the effective of interdependence manipu-
lation, we asked participants to indicate whether they
expected their future relationship with the candidate
who gets hired would be competitive or cooperative.
Race manipulation and pretest. Next, the par-
ticipants were presented with profiles of the two
candidates. The word length and format were held
constant, but, as in the previous studies, content
related to areas such as hobby, major, and university
varied slightly between the two profiles to make the
recruitment simulation more realistic. We counter-
balanced the race of the candidate across the two
profiles. The race manipulation was the same as in
previous studies, with the exception that we used the
name David Schmitt for the White candidate as
a somewhat more typicalWhite-specific name, based
on a U.S. Census report (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).
To check the effectiveness of the race manipulation,
we asked the participants to indicate what they
thought each candidate’s race was among the cate-
gories recognized by the U.S. Census Bureau (2013).
Candidate perceptions and selection decisions.
The participants were asked to provide their eval-
uation of each candidate. Specifically, using the
same items as in the task requirement pretest and
previous studies, the participants indicated how in-
tellectually competent (aWhite5 .93; aAsian5 .94) and
dominant (aWhite 5 .78; aAsian 5 .83) they thought
each candidate was. In addition, we measured per-
ceived instrumentality of the candidate to the de-
cision maker by asking participants to indicate their
agreement (1 5 “strongly disagree” to 7 5 “strongly
agree”) with the following statement: “If this person
is hired for the position inmy department, thismakes
my career success within the department more
likely.” To measure selection preference, we asked
the participants to respond to the following question:
“How likely would you be to recommend hiring this
person for the position in your department?” (1 5
“very unlikely” to 7 5 “very likely”).
STUDY 3: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Manipulation Checks
The majority of participants correctly identified
the race of the White candidate (98.4%), x2(1, n 5
122) 5 232.15, p , .001, as well as the race of the
Asian candidate (100%; perfect classification).
In addition, the majority of participants in the
competition condition (95.2%), x2(1, n5 63)5 51.57,
p , .001, indicated that they expected a competitive
relationship with the hired candidate; the majority of
participants in the cooperation condition (96.7%), x2
(1, n 5 59) 5 51.27, p, .001, expected a cooperative
relationship.5
Stereotypes of Asians and Whites
The Asian candidate (mean5 5.61, SD5 0.96) was
seen as more intellectually competent compared to
the White candidate (mean 5 5.48, SD 5 0.87), F (1,
121)5 4.57, p5 .035, hp
25 .04. TheWhite candidate
(mean5 4.79, SD5 0.78) was seen asmore dominant
compared to the Asian candidate (mean5 4.63, SD5
0.78), F(1, 121) 5 5.14, p 5 .025, hp
2 5 .04.
Racial Discrimination in Selection Decisions
Means of selection decisions by condition are
displayed in Figure 5. Across conditions, decision
makers, who were predominately White, exhibited
a similar preference for theWhite candidate (mean5
5.26, SD 5 1.39) as they did for the Asian candi-
date (mean 5 5.11, SD 5 1.49), F(1, 118) 5 0.26,
p 5 .613, hp
2 5 .002. Restricting the sample for
the analysis to White participants led to the same
conclusion, F(1, 105) 5 0.10, p 5 .749, hp
2 5 .001.
Therefore, we did not find evidence of a general
preference for candidates of the same race. Next, we
examined whether decision makers instead
5 We also estimated for all manipulation checks in
Studies 3 and 4 a model that included all manipulations
and their interactions, and the only significant effects
were the main effects reported in the paper (in Study 3 all
other ps . .208; in Study 4, all other ps . .138).
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discriminated in line with the predictions of our
theoretical model.
When the task required intellectual competence,
the White candidate (mean 5 5.29, SD 5 1.32) was
preferred to the Asian candidate (mean 5 3.79,
SD 5 1.37) when the decision maker expected to
compete with the candidate, F(1, 118) 5 22.87, p ,
.001, hp
2 5 .16; however, when the decision maker
expected to cooperate with the candidate, the Asian
candidate (mean5 6.45, SD5 0.63) was preferred to
the White candidate (mean 5 5.41, SD 5 1.18), F(1,
118) 5 9.28, p 5 .003, hp
2 5 .07.
In contrast, when the task required dominance,
the Asian candidate (mean 5 5.45, SD 5 1.33) was
preferred to the White candidate (mean 5 4.59,
SD 5 1.72) when the decision maker expected to
compete with the candidate, F(1, 118) 5 6.44, p 5
.012, hp
2 5 .05, but when the decision maker
expected to cooperate with the candidate, theWhite
candidate (mean 5 5.73, SD 5 1.08) was preferred
to the Asian candidate (mean 5 5.00, SD 5 1.02),
F(1, 118) 5 4.82, p 5 .030, hp
2 5 .04.
The results for both tasks thus support Hypothe-
ses 1 and 2: Decision makers discriminated against
candidates stereotyped as having a greater ability
required for the task when they expected to compete
with the candidate who would be hired, but in these
candidates’ favor when cooperation was expected.
The Role of Instrumentality Perception
We followed the same mediation analysis pro-
cedure as in Study 1. First, focusing on the task re-
quiring intellectual competence, when the decision
maker expected to compete with the candidate, the
perception of greater intellectual competence of the
Asian candidate led to a relatively lower perception
of the instrumentality of the candidate to the decision
FIGURE 5
Study 3, Selection Decisions by Conditiona
a Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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maker (b 5 20.92, SE 5 0.35, p 5 .010) and, in turn,
a lower selection preference for the Asian (relative to
the White) candidate (conditional indirect effect CI:
21.65, 20.13). In contrast, when the decision maker
expected to cooperate with the candidate, the per-
ception of greater intellectual competence of the
Asian candidate led to a relatively higher perception
of the instrumentality of the candidate to the decision
maker (b 5 0.92, SE 5 0.43, p 5 .035) and, in turn,
a higher selection preference for the Asian (relative to
the White) candidate (conditional indirect effect CI:
0.26, 1.07).
Next, focusing on the task requiring dominance,
when the decision maker expected to compete with
the candidate, the perception of greater dominance
of the White candidate led to a relatively lower
perception of the instrumentality of the candidate to
the decision maker (b521.56, SE5 0.37, p, .001)
and, in turn, a lower selection preference for the
White (relative to Asian) candidate (conditional in-
direct effect CI:21.73,20.38). In contrast, when the
decision maker expected to cooperate with the
candidate, the perception of greater dominance of
the White candidate led to a relatively higher per-
ception of the instrumentality of the candidate to the
decisionmaker (b5 1.09, SE5 0.40, p5 .009) and, in
turn, a higher selection preference for the White
(relative to Asian) candidate (conditional indirect CI:
21.82,20.54). The results thus support Hypothesis 3.
STUDY 4: METHODS
The main goal of Study 4 was to test our theoret-
ical model in a different empirical context and thus
demonstrate the generalizability of our theory to
other instances of discrimination. While Studies
1–3 focused on racial discrimination, in Study 4 we
focused on age discrimination. To test our hypoth-
eses, we examined how decision makers discrimi-
nate when making selection decisions for tasks in
which younger versus older candidates are stereo-
typed as having a greater ability required for suc-
cessful performance in the task.
Prior research has found that younger employees
are stereotyped as more creative, but less stable
(dependable), compared to older employees (for
meta-analyses, see Finkelstein et al., 1995; Ng &
Feldman, 2012). Creativity refers to how well
employees manage new information and changes,
and how capable they are of generating new ideas
(Anderson, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2004). Characteristics
that define creativity include being innovative,
creative, adaptable, flexible, and curious (Avolio &
Barrett, 1987; Cleveland & Landy, 1983; Rosen &
Jerdee, 1976). Stability refers to individuals’ ability
to act and perform in a consistent and reliable
manner, and is defined by such traits as stable, de-
pendable, careful, cautious, and steady (Bal, Reiss,
Rudolph, & Baltes, 2011; Finkelstein et al., 1995;
Rosen & Jerdee, 1976).
Therefore, we tested our theory by examining
selection decisions between younger versus older
candidates for tasks that require either pre-
dominately creativity or predominately stability
for successful performance. Our hypotheses imply
that when decision makers select candidates for
tasks that require creativity, and they expect to be
competitively (cooperatively) interdependent with
the candidate who is hired, they should discriminate
against (in favor of) younger candidates, because
younger people are stereotyped as having a greater
ability required for the task. In contrast, when de-
cision makers select candidates for tasks that pre-
dominately require stability, and they expect to be
competitively (cooperatively) interdependent with
the candidate who is hired, they should discrimi-
nate against (in favor of) older candidates, because
older people are stereotyped as having a greater
ability required for the task. Finally, the perception
of the instrumentality of the candidate to the de-
cision maker should mediate these discriminatory
tendencies.
Participants and Design
A total of 121 male participants (mean age 5
30.77, SD 5 10.01; 80.2% White, 12.4% Asian,
5.7% Black, and 1.7% American Indian) were
recruited using the same procedure as in Study 3.
The participants were randomly assigned to
conditions of a 2 (interdependence: competition
versus cooperation; between-subject) 3 2 (task re-
quirement: stability versus creativity; between-
subject) 3 2 (candidate age: 25 years old versus 50
years old; within-subject) design.
Procedure and Materials
The procedure and materials were almost identical
to those used in Study 3 except that the manipulation
of task requirement, candidate profiles, and questions
about candidate perception were adjusted to test our
theory in the context of age discrimination.
Task requirement manipulation and pretest.
Participants in the stability (creativity) condition
read that they had just started working in the
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corporate strategy (product design) department at
ABC Company.
We conducted a task requirement pretest among
an independent sample of adult males (n 5 44;
mean age 5 32.07, SD 5 10.07) to verify that the
product design position was seen as requiring more
creativity (and less stability) compared to the cor-
porate strategy position. Following previous re-
search (Cleveland & Landy, 1983; Meyer, Dalal, &
Bonaccio, 2009), the participants were asked to in-
dicate how important the following characteristics
were for success at each of the two tasks: stable,
dependable, careful, cautious, steady (stability); and
innovative, creative, adaptable, flexible, and curi-
ous (creativity). The results confirmed that the cor-
porate strategy department was seen as requiring
a higher level of stability (mean 5 5.66, SD 5 0.92;
a 5 .81) compared to the job in the product design
department (mean 5 5.06, SD 5 1.19; a 5 .88),
F (1, 43)5 17.59, p, .001, hp
25 .29. In contrast, the
product design department was seen as requiring
a higher level of creativity (mean5 6.26, SD5 0.75;
a 5 .84) compared to the job in the corporate strat-
egy department (mean 5 5.24, SD 5 1.14; a 5 .87),
F (1, 43) 5 36.23, p , .001, hp
2 5 .46. Thus, the
manipulation of task requirement was effective.
Candidate perceptions and selection decisions.
The profiles of the two candidates were similar to
each other, except for the age indicated on the profile
(25 versus 50 years old), and we counterbalanced the
age of the candidate across the two profiles. Then,
using the same items as in the task requirement pre-
test, the participants indicated how stable (aold5 .91;
ayoung 5 .96) and creative (aold 5 .92; ayoung 5 .85)
they thought each candidate was. To check the ef-
fectiveness of the age manipulation, we asked the
participants how old they thought each candidate
was (1 5 “very young” to 7 5 “very old”). All other
measures and materials were the same as in Study 3.
STUDY 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Manipulation Checks
The participants perceived the 25-year-old can-
didate (mean 5 2.20, SD 5 0.79) to be younger than
the 50-year-old candidate (mean5 5.36, SD5 0.82),
F(1, 120) 5 769.71, p , .001, hp
2 5 .87.
In addition, the majority of participants in the
competition condition (100%, perfect classification)
indicated that they expected a competitive relation-
ship with the candidate who is hired, and the ma-
jority of participants in the cooperation condition
(96.8%), x2(1, n 5 63) 5 55.25, p , .001 expected
a cooperative relationship.
Stereotypes of Old and Young Candidates
The 25-year-old candidate (mean 5 5.39, SD 5
0.99) was seen as more creative compared to the 50-
year-old candidate (mean 5 4.56, SD 5 1.11), F (1,
120) 5 41.06, p , .001, hp
2 5 .26. The 50-year-old
candidate (mean 5 5.72, SD 5 0.87) was seen as
more stable than the 25-year-old candidate (mean
5 4.38, SD 5 1.15), F(1, 120) 5 100.41, p , .001,
hp
2 5 .46.
Discrimination in Selection Decisions
Means of selection decisions by condition are
displayed in Figure 6. Across conditions, the
decision makers’ own age did not affect their pref-
erence for candidates of different ages,F(1, 116)5 0.04,
p 5 .836, hp
2 , .001. Therefore, we did not find
evidence of a general preference for candidates who
were similar to the decision makers in terms of age.
We next examined whether the decision makers
instead discriminated in line with the predictions of
our theoretical model.
When the task required stability, the 25-year-old
candidate (mean5 5.97, SD5 1.00) was preferred to
the 50-year-old candidate (mean 5 3.50, SD 5 2.00)
when the decision maker expected to compete with
the candidate, F(1, 117)5 36.85, p, .001, hp
25 .24,
but when the decision maker expected to cooperate
with the candidate, the 50-year-old candidate (mean5
6.12, SD 5 0.99) was preferred to the 25-year-old
candidate (mean 5 4.21, SD 5 1.17), F(1, 117) 5
22.73, p , .001, hp
2 5 .16.
In contrast, when the task required creativity, the
50-year-old candidate (mean5 5.89, SD5 1.03) was
preferred to the 25-year-old candidate (mean5 3.27,
SD 5 1.87) when the decision maker expected to
compete with the candidate, F(1, 117) 5 33.61, p ,
.001, hp
2 5 .22, but when the decision maker expec-
ted to cooperate with the candidate, the 25-year-old
candidate (mean 5 6.30, SD 5 1.26) was preferred to
the 50-year-old candidate (mean 5 4.00, SD 5 1.53),
F(1, 117) 5 29.00, p , .001, hp
2 5 .20.
The results for both tasks thus support Hypoth-
eses 1 and 2: Decision makers discriminated
against candidates stereotyped as having a greater
ability required for the task when they expected to
compete with the candidate who would be hired,
but in these candidates’ favor when cooperation
was expected.
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The Role of Instrumentality Perception
We followed the same mediation analysis pro-
cedure as in previous studies. First, regarding the
task that required stability, the results showed that
when the decision maker expected to compete with
the candidate, the perception of greater stability of
the 50-year-old candidate led to a relatively lower
perception of the instrumentality of the candidate to
the decision maker (b520.53, SE5 0.21, p5 .016)
and, in turn, a lower selection preference for the 50-
year-old (relative to the 25-year-old) candidate
(conditional indirect effect CI: 20.85, 20.03). In
contrast, when the decision maker expected to co-
operate with the candidate, the perception of greater
stability of the 50-year-old candidate led to a rela-
tively higher perception of the instrumentality of
the candidate to the decision maker (b 5 0.72, SE 5
0.33, p 5 .032) and, in turn, a higher selection
preference for the 50-year-old candidate (relative to
the 25-year-old) candidate (conditional indirect ef-
fect CI: 0.13, 0.92).
Regarding the task that required creativity, the
results showed that when the decision maker expec-
ted to compete with the candidate, the perception
of greater creativity of the 25-year-old candi-
date led to relatively lower perception of the
instrumentality of the candidate to the decision
maker (b 5 20.90, SE 5 0.42, p 5 .038) and, in
turn, lower selection preference for the 25-year-
old (relative to the 50-year-old) candidate
(conditional indirect effect CI: 21.96, 20.09). In
contrast, when the decision maker expected to
cooperate with the candidate, the perception of
greater creativity of the 25-year-old candidate led
to a relatively higher perception of the instru-
mentality of the candidate to the decision maker
(b5 1.65, SE5 0.48, p5 .001) and, in turn, a higher
selection preference for the 25-year-old (relative
to the 50-year-old) candidate (conditional indirect
FIGURE 6
Study 4, Selection Decisions by Condition
a Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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effect CI: 0.18, 2.32). The results thus support
Hypothesis 3.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Theoretical Contribution
This research contributes to the literature by
proposing and testing a novel explanation for dis-
crimination in selection decisions. By specifying
the conditions under which decisions discriminate
in favor of, as well as against, candidates that belong
to the same social group, our theory may help to
explain the mixed findings for the dominant theo-
retical paradigm, which suggests that decision
makers exhibit a preference for candidates that be-
long to the same social group (Allport, 1954; Pager &
Shepherd, 2008; Whitley & Kite, 2009). It is relevant
to note that our research does not imply that favor-
itism for candidates that belong to the same social
group plays no role in selection decisions. Rather,
we show that this force can be overridden by self-
interested considerations on the part of decision
makers, jointly defined by stereotypical beliefs
about candidates’ abilities and expectations of fu-
ture interdependence with the candidate. In the
absence of strong task imperatives or future in-
terdependence, it could be the case that decision
makers select others who are from their own social
group. The social identity approach, similarity-
attraction model, and theories focusing on intergroup
conflict may be more relevant in such circumstances
than our theory.
While we tested our theory in the context of racial
and age discrimination, we believe our model may
explain various instances of discrimination in se-
lection decisions that satisfy the assumptions of our
theory. As long as members of different social
groups are stereotyped differently in terms of
a characteristic that the decision maker considers
relevant for execution of the task for which
the candidates are being considered, our theory
should be a useful explanatory tool for under-
standing decision makers’ discriminatory ten-
dencies. For instance, our theory should be able
to explain gender discrimination for jobs that are
seen to require masculine versus feminine traits
(Glick et al., 1988). Women (men) are stereotyped
as having the characteristics required for suc-
cessful performance of tasks that require feminine
(masculine) characteristics. For that reason, decision
makers should discriminate against them (in their fa-
vor) when competitive (cooperative) interdependence
is expected. The theory can similarly be applied to
explain discrimination of other social groups, in-
cluding people of other races (e.g., discrimination
against black candidates), religious beliefs, and
sexual orientations.
We also contribute to research on discrimination
in organizations by situating decision-makers’ be-
havior in the context of intra-organizational in-
terdependent relationships. Most prior models of
discrimination in selection decisions have assumed
that decision makers expect no future relationship
with the candidate; however, this assumption is
untenable considering how many real-world selec-
tion decisions are made (Edenborough, 2005; Harris
et al., 2003). We show that taking into account the
expected interdependence between decision makers
and candidates, and the corresponding perceived
instrumentality of the candidates, can provide a
powerful explanation for discriminatory behavior in
organizations.
Although self-interested considerations have
been emphasized in the theoretical economics lit-
erature as a potentially relevant factor in discrimi-
nation (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972), such motives
have been underutilized as an explanation in the or-
ganizational literature. In contrast, “softer” motives,
such as likeability and conflict aversion, have long
been regarded as the key mediating variable in
explaining discrimination related to performance
evaluation and selection decision (Whitley & Kite,
2009). Our results highlight the importance of con-
sidering intra-organizational interdependencies and
the corresponding instrumentality perceptions for the
understanding of other interpersonal decisions in
organizations that have often been conceptualized as
having been made in a social vacuum, such as per-
formance evaluations, promotion decisions, and
compensation negotiations.
Limitations and Further Research
We tested our theory in the context of selection
decisions in which both the decision makers and
candidates were men. In addition, Studies 1–3 fo-
cused on selection decisions between White and
Asian candidates. Thus, generalizing our conclusions
to other combinations of decision-maker–candidate
gender or race warrants caution. Decisions con-
cerning our study design were guided by the fact
that this research constitutes the initial test of our
theory; thus, providing internally consistent tests
was the priority. We sought to accomplish this goal
through controlled experiments in which we
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minimized additional sources of variation, in-
cluding gender. However, as Cook and Campbell
(1979) note, such sampling decisions may pose
a threat to the external validity of inferences, par-
ticularly when there is an interaction between the
causal relationships and sample characteristics. In
our case, this is a potential concern. Prior work
suggests that women might be less instrumental in
their decisions (Bakan, 1966; McClelland, 1975;
Tannen, 1991). Thus, because the effects we docu-
mented are based on the propensity to be in-
strumental when making selection decisions, they
might be expressed less strongly among women.
Future research is needed to test our theory in the
context of other combinations of decision-maker–
candidate gender and race, and in so doing perhaps
identify boundary conditions of our theory.
Future research should examine other individual
differences that might affect how instrumental de-
cision makers are in their selection decisions. For
instance, people differ in the degree to which they
are motivated to follow their self-interest at the ex-
pense of the interests of others (De Dreu & Nauta,
2009; Van Lange, 1999), such as their organization.
Those who are relatively more motivated to benefit
their organization (rather than themselves) should
be less likely to exhibit self-serving discriminatory
tendencies in situations that contrast personal and
organizational interests, such as those in which the
decision maker expects to be competitively in-
terdependent with the candidate who is hired, and
thus has incentive to hire the weakest candidate,
which is contrary to the interest of the organization.
Research has also shown that individuals differ in
how prejudiced they are toward other racial groups
(Stewart & Perlow, 2001; Whitley & Kite, 2009).
Among people who harbor strong aversion to racial
out-groups, discrimination in favor of candidates of
the same race might be less likely to abate as a result
of greater perceived instrumentality of candidates of
other races. Strongly prejudiced individuals might
prefer members of their own race even when this
goes against their self-interest; i.e., when such can-
didates are less instrumental to their personal out-
comes. Future research is needed to explore this
possibility.
Our research focused on situations in which de-
cision makers face a choice between equally quali-
fied candidates. While this allowed us to isolate the
effect of race in selection decisions (and in that way
operationalize racial discrimination), we note that
stereotypical beliefs about candidates’ abilities
might be less relevant in situations in which some
candidates are clearly more qualified than others
(Dipboye, Fromkin, & Wiback, 1975). Future re-
search is needed to ascertain the power of stereo-
typical beliefs about candidates’ abilities based
on their social group membership in the effects
we documented, relative to other sources of in-
formation about potential future performance, such
as candidates’ educational record or prior work
experience.
Our theory is also limited to situations in which
decision-maker–candidate interdependence exists.
While we believe that decision makers often expect
at least some degree of interdependence with the
candidate (e.g., at the very least by virtue of working
within the same organization), our theory should be
less relevant in situations in which interdependence
is less pronounced. Nevertheless, we note that the
largest part of the economy is composed of small to
medium firms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Levine,
2005), and in such smaller firms, people who make
decisions about candidates arguably have some level
of interdependence with the candidate who is hired.
In addition, even in large organizations, employees
working on tasks that require advanced skills might
be best placed to evaluate potential candidates for
work on similar jobs. Therefore, while decision-
maker–candidate interdependence is certainly pres-
ent to a varying degree across different organizations,
we believe this aspect of selection decisions in
organizations does manifest in a considerable num-
ber of cases. Future research might examine how
differences in the strength of interdependence of the
decision maker and the candidate who is hired affect
the explanatory power of our model.
An important extension of this research would be
to test our theory using large-scale passive obser-
vational studies in the field. For instance, one ap-
proach to further testing of our theory in the field
might be to measure cooperative and competitive
interdependence among members of hiring com-
mittees and then measure their initial candidate
preferences.
Managerial Implications
By shedding new light on causes of discrimina-
tion, this research provides some clear prescriptions
for managers. We demonstrate that expected in-
terdependence between the person making the se-
lection decision and the candidate, along with
decision makers’ stereotypes about members of
different social groups, can lead to discriminatory
decisions. Awareness of potential interdependence
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and stereotyping tendencies should allow organ-
izations to design selection practices that will min-
imize potential discrimination.
One feature of the selection process could be
a focused accountability system. Making decision
makers accountable can decrease their tendency to
follow their self-interest at the expense of others
(Pitesa & Thau, 2013). In addition, research shows
that accountability concerns motivate thorough
processing of social information (Chaiken, 1980),
which should reduce reliance on stereotypes
(Bodenhausen, 1990). Thus, by ensuring that de-
cision makers are accountable, managers might be
able to inhibit reliance on stereotypes and in that
way interrupt the process behind the discrimina-
tory behavior documented in this research.
CONCLUSION
This research proposed and tested a novel theo-
retical model to explain how and why discrimina-
tion in selection decisions occurs. We situated
selection decisions in the organizational context of
differential task requirements and decision-maker–
candidate interdependence, which allowed us to
diverge from the dominant theoretical paradigm
which suggests that decisions makers systematically
prefer candidates that belong to their own social
group, and to propose a more nuanced view of dis-
crimination in organizations.
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